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My cattle and your park: codesigning a role-playing game with rural
communities to promote multistakeholder dialogue at the edge of protected
areas
Arthur Perrotton 1,2, Michel de Garine-Wichatitsky 1,3,4, Hugo Valls-Fox 5 and Christophe Le Page 6
ABSTRACT. Protected areas are often burdened with conflicts between environmental managers and neighboring rural communities.
Unsuccessful top-down approaches for conservation may be replaced by alternative forms of systemic management involving local
actors in the design and implementation of conservation management. Although theoretically sound and appealing, the involvement
of local residents in the management of protected areas is often impaired in practice by scale mismatches, conflicting values and interests,
power imbalance, and a lack of trust among actors. In this paper, we describe a process initiated in Zimbabwe to create a fair and
balanced locally designed arena where local communities and protected area managers may collaborate to produce effective management
plans. Adopting the Companion Modeling approach, we conducted a participatory modeling experiment to codesign a role-playing
game that simulates the interactions between farming activities, livestock herding practices, and wildlife in a virtual landscape
reproducing local social–ecological dynamics. After 18 months of intensive ethnographical fieldwork to gain knowledge and legitimacy,
we spent one year codesigning the first version of the game with a group of volunteer villagers. The game, called Kulayijana (teaching
each other), was tested and validated by other members of the rural communities and subsequently presented to protected area managers.
We show how this approach allowed the negotiation of uncertainties and their inclusion in a model that constitutes a shared
representation of farmers’ interactions with the protected area. We emphasize the fact that working with marginalized actors first
increased participation, appropriation, and confidence of rural communities to engage in a multistakeholder debate, thus reducing
power imbalance among actors. We conclude by discussing the next phase of our work: the necessary involvement of conservation
actors in the Kulayijana team, and the implementation of Kulayijana with higher hierarchical levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Protected areas have been widely used as a strategy for conserving
biodiversity in the face of ecosystem degradation (Palomo et al.
2014). However, like any other efforts to protect the environment,
they are often associated with conflicts between local actors
(Wittmer et al. 2006), including illegal hunting (Rowcliffe et al.
2004), human–wildlife conflicts (Dublin and Hoare 2004,
Guerbois et al. 2012, Dickman et al. 2014, Lyamuya et al. 2014,
Chitakira et al. 2015, Constant et al. 2015, Matema and
Andersson 2015), coercion and violence toward local populations
(Duffy 2014), and the symmetrical, sometimes violent, protest of
local populations to conservation policies (Newmark and Hough
2000, Orlove 2002, Stern 2008). Protests are fueled by past and
present social violence experienced by people living on the edges
of protected areas. As pointed out for instance by Agrawal and
Ostrom (2001), the creation of protected areas alters land-use
rights, leading to the alienation of land from the original users
and their criminalization (Ncube 2004, West et al. 2006). Top-
down approaches of conservation implemented by states have
failed to appreciate local practices and interests and have often
ignored the fact that local communities are shouldering the cost
of conserving a global public goods (Brockington and Wilkie
2015). This was summarized in the Durban Action Plan produced
after the fifth World Park Congress (International Union for
Conservation of Nature 2003), which states that there are
connections between dispossession and poverty, culture change
and social subsistence losses on the part of people living around
protected areas (MacKay and Carison 2004). As an answer to the
struggle to enforce conservation policies, protected areas are
increasingly being militarized (Duffy 2014, Verweijen and
Marijnen 2016).  
Over the last three decades, several alternative forms of
management have emerged to replace the adversarial and
centralized enforcement of conservation policies. Adaptive
management (Allen and Garmestani 2015), collaborative
management (Ansell and Gash 2008), and adaptive
comanagement (Fabricius and Currie 2015) share common
conceptual underpinnings of the social–ecological system
framework (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). They first acknowledge
the need to consider both local ecological and social dynamics
(Mathevet et al. 2016) and the necessity of adopting
interdisciplinary approaches. They also acknowledge the inherent
uncertainties and unpredictability of social–ecological dynamics
(Dewulf et al. 2005, Brugnach et al. 2008, Allen and Gunderson
2011). When uncertainty results from a lack of scientific
knowledge, these new forms of management use the participation
of local actors in “extended peer communities” (Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1993) for expert knowledge and local knowledge to be
shared and mixed (Allen and Gunderson 2011). In other words,
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participation is seen as a way to increase knowledge, which in turn
reduces uncertainties. These approaches rely on the assumption
that participatory management of renewable resources is more
efficient because decisions, actions, and consequences occur at
the same scale (Cinner et al. 2012). Finally, they propose the
adoption of a cyclical iterative process through which local actors
define objectives, implement them, and learn (Fabricius and
Currie 2015).  
Although these concepts are promising and theoretically sound,
their implementation in natural resource management has failed
more often than not (Allen and Gunderson 2011). Among the
factors explaining such failure is the fact that the involvement of
local residents, one of their core ideas, is still controversial
(Mannigel 2008). As pointed by Cumming et al. (2013),
international treaties and conventions frame conservation
policies, and these agreements have been translated and
implemented at the national scale. However, the implementation
of management decisions takes place at the local level and
depends on local resources. Yet, the feedbacks from local levels
are always weaker than the constraints imposed by higher levels.
As a result, collaborative management involving local rural
communities, local managers, and international conventions is
hardly possible. This situation is a typical “scale mismatch”
among institutional, management, ecological, and social
dynamics (Maciejewski et al. 2014). As expressed by Wells and
McShane (2004), if  protected areas have limited prospects without
cooperation and support from local people, any form of collective
management implies navigating through multiple and equally
valid framings of a given issue (Dewulf et al. 2005). These multiple
framings result in ambiguities and misunderstandings between
actors (Brugnach et al. 2008), not to mention the potential
conflicting values and perspectives brought in by the stakeholders
(Balint 2011, Curtin 2014). Finally, a true and sustainable
collaboration between actors is difficult to implement considering
the accumulation of historical injustice inherent to the
establishment of many protected areas (West et al. 2006,
Andersson et al. 2013b), power imbalances between rural
communities and governmental environment management
authorities (Ansell and Gash 2008, Crane et al. 2009), and the
resultant lack of trust between these actors (Stern 2008).  
In this paper, we describe the first step of a long-term project in
western Zimbabwe addressing some of the pitfalls described
earlier. We aim to create a fair and balanced locally designed arena
where local communities and protected area managers can meet,
discuss, negotiate, and produce effective management plans.
Adopting the companion modeling (ComMod) approach, we
conducted a participatory modeling experiment with rural
communities to codesign an interactive model simulating
interactions between farming activities, livestock herding, and
wildlife in a virtual landscape. Unlike most other ComMod
processes described in the literature, prior to the design of the
actual model, 18 months were dedicated to an immersive
ethnographic fieldwork among local communities to gather a
detailed understanding of the social–ecological context. It
appeared that cattle crystalizes tensions between rural
communities and protected areas in the study area. Such a long
preliminary phase also enabled us to build trust and acquire the
legitimacy needed by researchers to act as facilitators in the
ComMod process. First, we present the approach and the study
area, then we provide details about the codesign of the role-
playing game with a small group of local farmers. We explain how
we obtained feedback to assess the codesigners’ perceptions of
this participatory process. To validate the game, we analyze three
sessions that were organized with other local farmers. Finally, we
describe how the game was also tested by a group of protected
areas managers, before discussing the lessons drawn from the
process and the challenges to be met in the next stages.
THE SIKUMI-HWANGE SOCIAL–ECOLOGICAL
SYSTEM: ACTORS AND LAND USE
History of coexistence in the area
The study area is located in the Kalahari sand dune system of
southern Africa (Stokes et al. 1997). This work was conducted in
the villages of Magoli, Siyalwindi, Chezhou, Dingani, and Jwape
within ward 15 of the Hwange District, western Zimbabwe (26.9°
E, 18.6°S; Fig. 1). The study area receives between 450 and 650
mm of rain per year and is characterized by the presence of dry
spells and droughts, which added to poor soils make this area
poorly suited to agriculture (Matarira and Jury 1992). Villages
are restricted to the communal area, which is dedicated to human
settlements with land allocated by traditional authorities
(Guerbois et al. 2013). Rural populations rely mainly on
subsistence agriculture. Maize, millet, and sorghum are the main
food crops, and some households own livestock (Andersson et al.
2013a). The villages neighbor two unfenced protected areas,
Hwange National Park (14.651 km²), a wildlife conservation and
tourism area located a few kilometers to the southwest, and
Sikumi Forest (1100 km²), a wildlife conservation, wildlife-based
tourism (seven lodges in the study area) and timber production
area adjacent to the communal land separated from the villages
by a single-lane tar road. Coexistence issues at the interface
between Hwange National Park, Sikumi Forest, and rural
populations include human–wildlife conflicts (Metcalfe and Kepe
2008), illegal hunting (Muboko et al. 2014), cattle incursions into
restricted protected areas, illegal wood harvesting, livestock
predation by wild carnivores, and crop raiding by wildlife
(Guerbois et al. 2012), along with disease transmission between
domestic livestock and wildlife (de Garine-Wichatitsky et al.
2013).
Fig. 1. Study area, villages adjacent to Hwange National Park
and Sikumi Forest, Zimbawe.
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Interactions between protected and communal areas have been
shaped by colonial and postindependence history. Local
communities have been evicted and resettled on two occasions by
the creation of the Wankie Game Reserve in 1928 and the
proclamation of Sikumi Forest in 1968 (Ncube 2004). Since then,
local communities have no right of access to Hwange National
Park for any natural resources use/extraction, except for the
occasional harvesting of thatching grass under the close
supervision of rangers. The severe droughts of the early 1990s
(Maphosa 1994) led the forestry commission and traditional
leaders to negotiate a right of access to the Sikumi forest for
neighboring communities. Herders obtained the right to graze
their cattle within the forest (Ncube 2004, Guerbois et al. 2013),
although the official authorized distance remains unclear and,
depending on the informant, ranges from 2–3 km according to a
forestry manager (Guerbois et al. 2013), and up to7 km according
to local herders. This right of access is a bone of contention
between traditional leaders and the forestry commission.
An ethnography of cattle-herding practices
Ethnographic fieldwork and analyses were conducted to
understand how cattle management was instrumental in shaping
coexistence between the protected area and neighboring
communities. Semidirected interviews and open discussions were
carried out with livestock owners and herders on the one hand
and with protected areas managers on the other. Interviews were
conducted in three different languages: English and the two major
local languages, chiNambya and sinNdebele. These were
completed with direct observations (e.g., participation in cattle
herding and other agricultural activity). We also had access to
livestock census books kept by traditional leaders. The next
paragraph presents the main findings of our observations, and
shows how cattle herding is at the core of interactions between
the different land uses, therefore justifying our decision to design
a game on cattle-related practices.  
Based on local records, only 32% of homesteads living in the study
area own cattle. On average, these families have 5.46 cattle (sd =
4.19). Livestock is nevertheless central to agricultural production,
and draft animals are often borrowed or sometimes rented,
strengthening social cohesion amongst neighbors. Livestock is
the main form of capitalization for rural populations. Beyond
their agricultural value, cattle also have a social dimension
through the payment of the bride price, locally called “lobola.”
Although foraging resources are a crucial driver, the cattle-
herding calendar is largely determined by agricultural practices
(Perrotton 2015, Valls-Fox 2015). The agricultural calendar
depends on weather patterns both on a large and a fine scale as
plowing strategies are revised almost daily by local farmers. We
can broadly distinguish three phases of cattle grazing. During the
cropping season (November–May), herders maintain cattle away
from fields to minimize incursions and resulting damages to crops.
Not every owner sends his cows into Sikumi Forest, and some
favor the communal grazing areas to reduce predation risk. Cattle
herded out of the communal area feed approximately from 11:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. in the forest, and natural water pans shape the
herding movements. Each year, traditional leaders define the
“xotshela,” meaning “release” in sinNdebele, giving the date after
which livestock are allowed to roam freely in the communal area.
Once the date is chosen, farmers must make sure all their fields
are harvested in time. After “xotshela,” cows are no longer herded
and roam freely in the fields, feeding on grass and crop residues.
However, they must be taken to the communal dams or to
boreholes to drink. Part of the crop residues are often stored
within the homestead to feed cows later on. Toward the beginning
of the hot and dry season, usually the end of August, cattle start
going unguarded in the forest as available fodder becomes too
scarce in the communal area. During this period, they usually go
foraging further inside the forest, and herders are often forced to
retrieve them, sometimes more than 7 km away from the boundary
of the Sikumi Forest. This is a general pattern for the majority of
cattle herds, but on an individual scale, cattle-herding strategies
are complex mechanisms that involve personal histories of owners
and herd-boys, a permanent consideration of dynamic
environmental parameters, the proximity of homesteads to the
forest, and neighbors’ strategies. The right of access to the
forestry’s land is crucial for livestock owners and simultaneously
constitutes a form of land claiming on a territory that used to be
owned by the villagers.  
Although they were not involved in the codesign of the simulation
tool described in the next session, we also spent time with local
conservation actors during this preliminary stage of the
participatory process. Interviews with protected areas managers
highlighted the complexity of management issues linked with
coexistence. Hwange National Park and the Sikumi Forest are
two conservation areas managed by government agencies, but
they have established different relationships with the surrounding
communities. Hwange National Park is dedicated to conservation
and tourism. From its creation, the park had limited interactions
with rural communities, except for occasional “community
awareness” meetings during which authorities deliver the
conservationist dogma to villagers, or when National Parks scouts
are sent to deter elephants and other wild animals away from
villages. Conflictive encounters with wildlife are frequent,
although these are rarely made public. When caught grazing
inside the park, cattle are impounded and released after payment
of a fine by the owner. Like other African countries, policies
against illegal hunting involve a shoot-to-kill approach (Duffy
2000, 2014), and the recent use of cyanide to illegally hunt
elephants (Muboko et al. 2014) or the illegal killing of Cecil the
lion in a neighboring hunting concession (Nelson et al. 2016) did
not push for a change. Sikumi Forest has completely different
relationships with rural communities. As we wrote in a previous
paragraph, natural resources within the forest are partly available
to villagers: grazing, thatching grass, construction poles (after a
permit is delivered by the local traditional authority and signed
by the local forestry manager), and firewood (only gathered by
women on Thursdays). In addition to providing natural resources,
Sikumi Forest sustains social relationships between local actors.
Nevertheless, several issues remain unsolved.  
We know they need to enter our forest, that’s why we are
flexible with them. But they go too far inside and create
problems for us. (A forestry manager, Sikumi, 2013.) 
As stated above, although forestry managers support a policy of
letting community members enter under strict rules, this
agreement is the source of various concerns, among which are
overgrazing to the detriment of wildlife and opportunistic
extraction activities, such as illegal wood harvesting or hunting,
and disturbance of tourism activities taking place in Sikumi
Forest only a few kilometers away from the villages.  
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Fig. 2. Codesign of the role-playing game through an iterative process. Each workshop provides new elements or
modifications that researchers use to improve the model/game. Each set of modifications is tested in the
following workshop in order to validate the changes made (e.g., Souchère et al. 2010).
Tensions around cattle at the interface between the protected areas
and neighboring rural community are typical of “wicked
problems” (Balint 2011): uncertainty (climate, resources
availability), incomplete scientific knowledge (e.g., how do
herders drive cattle? What is the vegetation composition in the
forest? How do cattle impact vegetation in the forest?), ambiguity
maintained by local actors (what is the legal right of access?),
competing cultural values (rural livelihood vs. wildlife
conservation and timber production), and interconnections with
other problems (unemployment, droughts). To address these
wicked problems, we applied a postnormal approach (Funtowicz
and Ravetz 2003) that promotes interdisciplinarity and
participatory methods in social–ecological sciences. Over the past
10 years, the researchers involved in this study engaged in
“research-action” programs to improve both conservation
practices and rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe. Linking policy
makers, extension services, and academics (social scientists,
modelers, economists, epidemiologists, and ecologists), a research
platform (“produce and conserve in partnership,” see http://www.
rp-pcp.org) was established. In recent years, a particular effort
was made to involve farming communities in the research program
and development activities.
COMPANION MODELING: COLLECTIVE SENSE
MAKING AND BOUNDARY OBJECTS
The companion modeling (ComMod) approach (Bousquet et al.
1999, Étienne 2014) aims at identifying the various viewpoints
and knowledge that local actors implicitly refer to and use in their
relationships with their environment, working out—together with
local stakeholders—a common vision of a given studied system
in order to (i) understand its functioning or (ii) facilitate decision-
making processes of stakeholders using a common resource.  
ComMod processes have been conducted in various contexts in
the past decades, such as land-use management in Senegal
(d’Aquino et al. 2003, d’Aquino and Bah 2014), conflicts over
water management in Thailand (Barnaud et al. 2006, 2008) and
Bhutan (Gurung et al. 2006), collective awareness of sustainable
use of reed beds (Mathevet et al. 2007), and hunting practices in
African tropical forests (Le Page et al. 2015). The objects used for
and produced through participation are “boundary objects”
linking different actors belonging to different social worlds but
involved in a common process (Vinck 2009, Queste et al. 2011).
In ComMod, they often take the form of role-playing games or
agent-based models. Among the fundamentals of ComMod are
feedback loops between the models and reality. These loops
constitute an iterative process (Fig. 2) during which the model is
designed, tested, and redesigned with local actors. Each actor
(researchers included) has his or her own mind-frame (Susskind
et al. 2012) and his or her own sense-making process that mediate
the interpretation of reality by adding meaning to a situation
(Weick 1995). A ComMod process can then be considered as a
collective sense-making process.  
In our case, this collective sense making was initiated with a group
composed of researchers and representatives of the rural
communities. Although the ultimate goal is to build a boundary
object to promote a multistakeholder dialogue, we did not involve
all of these actors at once. Rural communities are marginalized
when it comes to land management and conservation policies. We
assumed that creating a fair and balanced multistakeholder arena
first required the empowerment of rural communities. Creating
the role-playing game with them first was our way to do so.  
In our case, the boundary object is a role-playing game. In this
paper, we’ll use specific words that need to be explained, thus a
set of definitions follows for the reader. Each definition is
illustrated with an example from our role-playing game.  
. Role-playing game: Technique or activity during which one
plays the role of a character in a virtual environment. The
player will influence the development of his character and
the virtual environment through his physical and narrative
actions, e.g., the role of a farmer. 
. Module: The role-playing game is a form of model, with a
virtual environment and characters interacting with it. As
such, dynamics taking place during its use (playing sessions)
rely on established rules/functions. These rules/functions can
be grouped by type or topic. These sets are called “modules”
and are small units structuring the game. In a computer-
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Fig. 3. Description of the prototype version of the role-playing game (V0): virtual environment (a), game setting
(b) and rain calendar (c). a. The figure shows the virtual environment. The communal land (yellow) and the
forest (green) are respectively composed of four and nine paddocks. Circles represent water pans (blue = filled,
white = empty). Each farm is composed of a kraal (black) and five fields (orange). Each farm has a color; each
herd has the color of its farm. Computerized farms are black and don’t have any herd. b. The virtual
environment was projected on the wall, and players had to come to the computer operator to signify their
playing decisions. c. The four types of weekly weather were represented by explicit symbols: a sun for a dry
weather with no rain, a light gray cloud for small rainfall, a dark gray cloud for medium rainfall, and a black
cloud for heavy rainfall.
based model, they correspond to units of computer
programs. The model supporting the game is run through
steps (months). At each step, players will make playing
decisions. In their functioning, modules take the current
state of the virtual environment and players’ actions into
account in order to update the virtual environment and
characters’ status. e.g., a “climate” module controls the
rainfall pattern displayed; the “wildlife” module controls the
behavior of wildlife in the game; the “cattle” module will
update cattle body condition. 
. Action: playing decision made by a player, e.g., planting a
field; selling a cow; protecting fields from elephants, or
negotiating with another player.
KULAYIJANA: CODESIGN OF A ROLE-PLAYING GAME
Setting up a codesign team
The codesign team gathered three researchers and ten villagers:
nine men and one woman were invited to join the team either
because we knew them personally and thought they would provide
relevant insights or because the headman, the local representative
of traditional authorities, trusted them. Their ages ranged from
39 to 57 years old. All but one were the head of their household.
Three were village heads, one was the secretary of a village head,
two were involved in dip-tank committees, one was the local
chairman of a community project developing goat husbandry,
and four held no position at the community level. They originated
from the different villages in the study area. Our local translator
was also part of the team. Occasionally, external researchers
joined the team during workshops, either to observe or
participate.
Initiation: a prototype version of the game
Information gathered during the ethnographical fieldwork was
used to design a “prototype version” (V0) of the game. The V0
was computer based and developed using CORMAS, an agent-
based simulation platform dedicated to renewable resources
management issues developed by the Centre de coopération
internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement
(CIRAD) (Le Page et al. 2012). The V0 was brought by the
researchers as an entry point to initiate the codesign process. The
main challenge was to come up with a game that was realistic
enough to legitimize us as facilitators of the modeling process
and catch the interest of the future codesign team members by
showing the potential outcomes of their participation while at the
same time leaving room for the team members to take over the
modeling process and suggest improvements. Hence the need to
introduce a highly simplified yet realistic model using the
ethnographical fieldwork.  
The game covered one agricultural year, from the beginning of
October one year to the end of September of the next. Each player
was in charge of a farm comprising five fields of about 0.5 acres
or “umfollow,” corresponding to the area that can be plowed in
one day (in orange in Fig. 3a ). Each player also owned a single
herd of five cows, which corresponds to the average herd size
observed. At the beginning of each round (month), players had
to make individual decisions concerning (i) which paddock their
cattle would use for grazing during the coming month and if  they
would be accompanied by a herd boy, (ii) their farming decisions
(planting, harvesting), and (iii) cattle transactions (sell/buy any
cows).  
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Following Barnaud’s advice (2013), the virtual environment was
similar to reality, i.e., it comprised a communal area and a forest,
but did not match the study area exactly. This allowed the
participants to create a distance from reality and provided a
nonthreatening environment whithin which local actors could
freely propose ideas without being constrained by the presence of
sensitive issues like the right of access to the forest (Fig. 3a).  
Moreover, V0 was deliberately incomplete and unrealistic to
encourage participants to make propositions and discuss them.
The players could only choose between a short-term or a long-
term variety from the same crop (respectively 3 or 4 months to
produce grains), with no occurrence of failures due to adverse
climatic conditions. Predation of cattle by wild carnivores only
occurred in the forest and was calculated by a simple probabilistic
model. Neither fodder dynamics (depletion or growth) nor cattle
body condition (fattening or thinning) nor water pans filling had
been included in the prototype version. The 13 paddocks that
made up the environment represented grazing units with four
levels of forage availability (null, poor, medium, and high), which
were updated directly by the facilitator according to the amount
of rainfall and grazing pressure. Elephants were not included on
purpose. “Forgetting” them was our stratagem to trigger a
discussion about wildlife in the game. Finally, daily rainfall
records from the 2012–2013 rainy season were used to
approximate weekly and monthly rainfall (Fig. 3c). Rainfalls were
the only quantitative data-based elements included in the game.
Iterative codesign
ComMod processes are usually achieved by iterations. Field
workshops aim at testing and improving the model. Each
workshop provides new elements or modifications that
researchers will use to improve the model functionalities. Each
set of modifications is tested in the following workshop in order
to validate the changes (e.g., Souchère et al. 2010). The first
workshop was the moment when the different members of the
team met each other around a common objective. Creating an
atmosphere of mutual trust was necessary; it was particularly
important to create a fair and balanced arena between researchers
and nonresearchers. The Magoli community hall was chosen for
the venue because the local members of the team could easily
come to that place and would feel confident there.  
Once the different members of the team had been introduced, we
presented the research project and the specific objectives of the
codesign process. It was made clear from the beginning that the
codesign process was open to suggestions and that each
participant could propose new rules during the game. After
exposing the principles of the V0 by asking a local member to
play a test month, the rest of the first day was spent playing with
all the team members (Fig. 3b). A first debriefing was done at the
end of the day, during which the team shared impressions about
the game and decided on a list of topics to be discussed the
following day. The second day of workshop was dedicated to a
collective revision of the game. Rules concerning livestock
predation by lions were entirely redesigned. Unsurprisingly,
elephants were brought in by local members. A simplified
elephant crop-raiding module was designed by the team, along
with the possibility for players to protect their fields from
elephants. The addition of livestock diseases was proposed but
finally abandoned. Rules of costs–benefits were also improved,
and the cattle selling/purchase rules were formalized. The crop
module wasn’t satisfying for most members of the team, and was
therefore intensively discussed and redesigned. The idea of having
only one type of crop was kept, but development stages were
added, along with the occurrence of crop failures due to droughts
or floods. A new action was added: when harvesting, players
would be able to either collect crop residues and feed their cattle
later with them, or leave them in the fields where any cattle could
eat them. In the V0, rains were displayed at the end of the month.
The local members of the team asked for a weather forecast at
the beginning of each month, explaining that in real life they had
access to short-term weather forecasts, either through
newspapers, radios, or traditional weather forecasting methods
(Perrotton 2015). Finally, the biggest contribution to the game of
this first workshop concerned livestock grazing management. The
subdivision of the environment in paddocks was kept, so was the
rule that each player could use one paddock per month to graze
his cattle. A completely new module of grazing resources
dynamics was designed around the notion of carrying capacity.
It was decided that the effects of grazing on a paddock would also
depend of the land cover, with slightly better pastures in the forest,
and on the season. The name “Kulima Kufuma,” meaning
“farming to get rich” in chiNambya (one of the local languages)
was chosen by local members of the team at the end of the first
workshop.  
Following the first workshop, the V0 was modified into the first
codesigned version (V1) incorporating all the team’s decisions.
Two other workshops held in November 2014 and April 2015
resulted in the production of V2 and FV, the final version (Fig.
2). During these workshops, the core of the game (e.g., rules,
modules) were collectively revised in order to create a more
realistic game that could easily be played by any local villager.
Some of the final modules were collectively built during
workshops, some were designed by researchers and validated by
the team. A second climatic year, also relying on meteorological
data collected in Hwange National Park (1921–1922) was chosen
to represent a drought. It had been one of the “worst” rainy
seasons of the last century for agricultural production, with low
annual rainfall and several dry spells. A full game session now
covered 2 years played in sequence, the “good year” first (2012–
2013), followed by the “bad year” (1921–1922). The codesigners
also discussed the physical support for the game. Computer-free
(V1) and computer-based (V0, V2, FV) versions of the game were
tested. The map was initially projected on a wall (V0), in later
versions (V2, FV) it was projected on a table around which all
players could move freely, position their pawns and interact with
each other or with the game facilitator (Fig. 4).  
Additionally, the computer would record every decision taken by
each player (e.g., in which paddock the cattle had been put to
graze each month, or the type of crops used and the success rate)
together with the occurrences of adverse events (e.g., the number
of cattle killed by lions and crop raiding by elephants). This
information was very useful to foster postplaying discussions.  
At the end of the third workshop, the team agreed that the game
was ready to be implemented, and five members of the team
volunteered to facilitate playing sessions with villagers.
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Fig. 4. The final version of the game. The projector displays the
board game on a central table. Players are around the board
and signify their actions by moving their pawns. Actions are
entered in the computer by the operator sitting at another table
(computer screen up front). The “game master”(dressed in a
white long-sleeved shirt, to the right) leads the game, the “ank
master” (absent in the picture) controls all the transactions, and
a third facilitator records minutes (striped t-shirt, at the back).
Almost a year after initiating the codesign, the game had been
substantially transformed and a new name was proposed by local
members of the team: “Kulayijana,” meaning “teaching each
other” in ChiNambya. A complete description of this final version
of the game is provided in Appendix 1.
PERCEPTION OF KULAYIJANA BY THE CODESIGN
TEAM
The 13 members of the codesign team (ten villagers and three
researchers) were asked to respond to individual questionnaires
between the last workshop and the first playing session with other
villagers. We asked the team members to comment about the
initialization of the process, the workshops, the final version of
the game, and their perception of this participatory process.
A collective effort toward Kulayijana
All the members of the team acknowledged they had a high degree
of freedom to propose original ideas during the codesign of the
game, and everyone could recall at least one personal idea that
had been kept in the final version of the game. The atmosphere
during the workshops was given an average ranking of 8.5/10
(±1.5). As one local member remarked:  
It was said to be our game, and we made it like that. 
The first two versions of the game (V0 and V1) were judged too
slow by 70% of the team. The direct use of pawns to signify
decisions (55%) introduced in the V1 and the choice of a central
game board improved the interactions between players for 70%
of the team. Nevertheless, the computer-free V1 made playing
too tedious for 69% of the team members because all updates
(including crop stages) had to be done manually. The strengths
of the final version cited by the team members were the speeding
up of the game (69%), its clarity (42%), and the fact that the
consequences of playing actions could easily be monitored and
recorded (38%). The whole team declared being satisfied with the
final version, although some members suggested possible
additional improvements such as the inclusion of seasonal rivers
(suggested by three members), or the display of alternative sources
of climatic information, such as songs played by birds that “[they]
use here to know when it is about to bring rain, they are our
reporters.” This last suggestion echoes previous research
(Perrotton et al., unpublished manuscript). The three researchers
of the codesign team also agreed that the speed of forage
depletion/(re)growth according to stocking densities and the
variable describing cattle body condition (thin/medium or fat)
could be improved. However, the spatial dimensions of the
environment in the game were not defined accurately and not
deemed essential by the codesign team, and refining the model
would necessitate costly on-site experiments with exclosures and
controlled grazing densities.
Self-empowerment and appropriation
When asked about their motivation in joining the process, six local
members answered that it was curiosity and the desire to learn,
three answered that they wanted to share ideas, and one wanted
to help researchers that he knew personally. The analysis of
questionnaires highlights the appropriation of the game by local
team members. An open question asked codesigners to give one
or more potential uses of the game they had created. As shown
in Fig. 5, most of the respondents emphasized the reflexive
dimension of “Kulayijana.” This directly echoes our initial
objective to empower rural communities. Indeed, two researchers
and six local members saw the game as a way for communities to
reflect about their own practices and discuss them among
themselves. Two local members explained that the game should
be used in schools “So that children grow up with a better
understanding of cattle herding.” The second group of potential
uses is also consistent with our original objectives as they are
related to the potential use of the game as a research tool through
which researchers could collect data and better understand local
practices and cattle herding. One of the researchers suggested the
game could serve to strengthen working relationships between
local actors. Finally, two unexpected uses were proposed by local
members: alleviate poverty and educate communities about
climate change. Although only mentioned by two people, this
emergence of endogenous perspectives for the game is a first
indication of an ongoing appropriation.  
Bonds were created between local members and researchers, and
the resolve to continue working to improve the game or design
other games was expressed by 70% of the team. Two potential
topics for future games emerged from the questionnaires. Three
local members proposed focusing on interactions with wildlife,
particularly crop raiding and predation, but also conservation to
“try to find solutions.” Two other local members expressed a real
concern about the loss of trees in the communal land and thought
that a game focusing on tree management could address the
matter. Through the construction of the game and its
implementation, the game was perceived as a self-learning and
self-empowering tool.  
A final indication of appropriation is the spontaneous desire to
facilitate playing sessions of five members of the team. Among
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Fig. 5. Potential future uses of the game as perceived by the team members. The different potential uses of the
game were given by local members (green, n = 10) and researchers (red, n = 3) in the questionnaire survey
administered before the playing sessions (May 2015).
the motivations to volunteer playing sessions, one emphasized the
educational dimension of the game and said that he wanted to
“help [his] community to improve the way people drive their
cattle,” whereas another one saw it as training to “be a leader.”
Three said that they were proud of the game and wanted to elicit
other villagers’ opinions of it.
VALIDATION OF THE GAME BY FARMERS
A model is always seen by those who designed it with indulgent
eyes because of an inherent sense of ownership. “Kulayijana” was
designed to be played by multiple stakeholders. To ensure it would
make sense for all of them, we first organized a playing session
with naive villagers, i.e., who were not part of the codesign team.
“Kulayijana” requires a minimum of four facilitators. The “game
master” is in charge of the facilitation in the strict sense. The
“bank master” is in charge of controlling and collecting all
transactions during the game. A computer operator enters
players’ decisions in the computer and ensures the smooth
running of the model supporting the game. Finally, in order to
stimulate the general discussions after the playing session, minutes
are recorded by the last facilitator. The facilitation by local
members allowed us to hold playing sessions in local languages.
An introductory speech for the game was collectively written in
local languages, and a blank game was played as training game
with workers from a neighboring hotel as players.  
Three playing sessions were organized (Fig. 2), and a total of 22
villagers played “Kulayijana.” The villagers (hereafter referred to
as “players”) were chosen by the facilitators and the researchers,
covering the different villages of our study area. Players were
neighbors or friends and, except for two players, direct family
links were avoided. Two dimensions of the game were assessed
through general discussions and individual questionnaires
administered after the game: the appreciation of the game by local
villagers and the consistency of played strategies with strategies
observed in real life.
Players’ appreciation of the game
The game was judged “very easy to play” by 18% of the players,
“easy” by 25% of the players, “not so easy” by 46% of the players,
and “not easy at all” by 11% of them. When asked to summarize
“Kulayijana” in up to three words, the 22 players mostly used
“real” (22.7%), followed by “learning” (18.2%) and “teaching”
(18.2%). Other words like “game for adults,” “life,” and “mind
opener” were also used to describe a playing experience that was
closer to training than playing. As expressed by a player:  
It’s not a game, it’s [our] real life. 
All the players thought playing “Kulayijana” was useful (75%) or
very useful (25%) and served as an opportunity to think (40%),
learn (28%), open their perspectives (12%), test agricultural
practices (8%), or train (8%). The self-learning dimension
highlighted by codesigners was therefore confirmed by players.  
Players were asked if  the game was “very realistic,” “realistic,”
“not too realistic,” or “not realistic at all.” Although they
mentioned some differences with reality, none of the players
answered negatively to the question, 57% of the participants
found the game “very realistic,” and 43% found it “realistic”.
Opinions about possible differences between the game’s modules
and reality varied between the modules. Unsurprisingly, the
climate module (based on empirical data) was realistic or very
realistic for 93% of the players. Eighty-two percent of the players
validated the crops dynamics module, although two thought the
game was missing crop-raiding birds such as the queleas (Quelea
quelea). Among the 18% of players who noted some differences,
three explained that crops do not grow the same everywhere so
that the game should include different types of soil, and four
thought that crops were ripening faster in the game than in real
life. For 85% of players, wildlife in the game presented no
difference at all or slight differences with reality. The confinement
of lions to the forest was criticized by 18% of the players who
acknowledged occasional attacks within the communal area.
Three players (13%) answered that elephants would enter the
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communal land more often in reality, but that they would cause
less damage than in the game. Although validated by 68% of the
players, the livestock module received more skeptical opinions
from the players, with 32% of them mentioning real differences
between their gaming experience and reality. Some of them
explained that the difference of pasture availability between the
communal land and the forest was underestimated in the game
(16%), others mentioned that livestock body condition was
decreasing too fast in the game (26.3%), or that on the contrary
livestock were staying “fat” longer in the game compared with
their experience in real life (26.3%). Finally, 17% of the players
suggested that unlike in the game, not all farmers own cattle and
that this inequality generated social interactions (lending,
fostering, and bartering) missing from the playing sessions.
Strategies in the game vs. strategies in real life
It is always challenging to assess the degree to which decisions
made by players during gaming sessions are related to their actual
practices. Out of the 22 players, 61% acknowledge having
reproduced their farming and cattle herding strategies “exactly”
in the game and 35% declared that their playing strategies were
“almost” like their real-life strategies. For 66% of the players, these
differences were said to be due to the discovering of the game.
Only 4% of players answered that their playing strategies were
“not really” similar to their actual practices.  
The general pattern of cattle-herding strategies as identified and
described in the ethnography was reproduced by players,
confirming our field observations. In particular, if  the choice of
a date for “xotshela” (release) never appeared explicitly during
playing sessions, the “habit” of favoring the forest during the
cropping season and waiting for harvests to be finished to release
them in the village was globally reproduced and respected. These
patterns were confirmed by an independent study of cattle
movement using GPS collars deployed in the study area (Fig. 6).
KULAYIJANA AND PROTECTED AREAS MANAGERS
To test how the game would be perceived by the other types of
stakeholders who were not involved in its design, a quick
presentation of the game was given to protected areas managers
in February 2016. The managers of each protected area were then
invited to appoint three members of their staff  to join them and
participate in a playing session held at the headquarters of
Hwange National Park a few days later. Seven players joined this
playing session, four officers from Hwange National Parks and
three from the Sikumi Forest (including the area manager). The
session was facilitated by three local members and a researcher
as computer operator.  
The fact that local members of the codesign team agreed to
facilitate such a session at the Hwange National Park
headquarters is encouraging for the next steps in our work. As
one of them declared on the way:  
It’s our game, we are proud of what we have done. It shows
our life, what we need, and what we have to live with 
[wildlife]. I hope they will like the game and see ways we
can play together. 
Fig. 6. Use of communal lands and forest estimated using
quantitative outputs from playing sessions and independent
cattle GPS data. The graphs represent the percentage of time
spent by cattle in the communal land (Village) and in the
protected area (Forest) for each season. Rainy season = October
to May; Cold Dry season= June to July; Hot Dry season =
August to September. Left: Estimates from the game were
obtained by pooling monthly grazing decisions of 22 players
during three playing sessions. Right: Real time spent by cattle
was obtained from nine cattle equipped with GPS collars
between 2012 and 2014 (Valls-Fox 2015).
Indeed, villagers were proud of a game they had developed and
mastered. During the game, facilitated in English, a very respectful
atmosphere was created. Parks and Forestry managers appreciated
the game. Below are a few quotes gathered during the session:  
I’m failing with my fields because of these elephants
(NParks officer). 
I need to go in the forest with my cows but I’m afraid of
lions (NParks officer). 
I’m harvesting as soon as I can, elephants will come again
(Forestry officer). 
I don’t want to keep cattle, I’d rather sell them and have
money (NParks officer). 
As always, a general discussion followed the game during which
strategies adopted by the players were analyzed. The local
members of the team compared their experience of the game, i.e.,
what their fellow villagers had done, and the way protected areas
managers had played. The latter had chosen a radically different
strategy: buy thin cattle, fatten them during the rainy season and
sell them before they lost weight during the dry season. Although
this strategy made them “rich,” local facilitators commented by
saying that real villagers wouldn’t do that because cattle were at
the heart of their culture and a sign of social and economic wealth
that money could not replace. This was the first confrontation of
the different mind-frames of local actors. When asked about their
perspectives on this game, two different attitudes were observed.
National Parks officers remained relatively quiet, which we explain
by the considerable top-down pressure they currently experience
due to an increase in big-game illegal hunting and scandals.
Managers of the Sikumi Forest on the other hand were very
enthusiastic:  
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This game is great, it could be useful for me to understand
better the way they [the villagers] use my forest, and if
we could play together and discuss, we could produce good
management plans. (Forestry officer) 
This last statement bodes well for the coming steps in the creation
of a multistakeholder arena, at least at the local level. The
foundations of a locally designed multistakeholder arena are in
place. The potential use of “Kulayijana” was acknowledged by
local actors willing to continue the process, and the marginalized
actors legitimized in the eyes of at least one protected area
managing team.
DISCUSSION
The initial objective of the project was to initiate a process aimed
at setting-up a fair arena for negotiations between multiple
stakeholders regarding the management of protected areas and
their peripheries. First, we involved the most marginalized actors
(local farmers) in the codesign of a computer-based role-playing
game focusing on their own activities, hoping that it would
empower them and therefore contribute to righting the power
imbalances that often hinder multistakeholder collaboration
(Beymer-Farris et al. 2012). Although only a single type of actor
was involved, we faced several challenges. In this discussion, we
draw lessons from our experience and return to issues of
legitimacy and uncertainties. We also discuss the challenge of
codesigning an interactive role-playing game that would make
sense to people who have not participated in its creation, and that
would attract them to engage in a multistakeholder dialogue
supported by this tool. This leads us to the current limitations of
our work, and to the necessary next steps toward the
multistakeholder arena.
Power balance and legitimacies: a strategic posture
Social and political equity are inherent objectives of participatory
approaches (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). As highlighted by
Barnaud and van Paassen (2013), participation often takes place
in heterogeneous social contexts characterized by conflicts of
interests and power asymmetries. This raises questions about the
legitimacy of external agents (e.g., the researchers) to conduct
participatory processes. According to the authors, ignoring the
complexity of the social context and particularly power
asymmetries might actually give more influence on the outcome
of the participatory process to powerful stakeholders than to
marginalized ones, therefore reinforcing initial asymmetries. The
dilemma of participation stems from the fact that designers of a
participatory approach cannot claim neutrality without being
accused of being manipulated by the most powerful actors,
whereas on the other hand, their legitimacy to endorse a
nonneutral posture empowering particular stakeholders is often
questionable. Managing this dilemma requires a posture more
than a method. The “critical companion” posture suggested by
Barnaud and van Paassen (2013:2) is a “non-neutral posture that
recognizes the necessity to take into account power asymmetries
to avoid the risk of increasing them.” In the introduction and in
the description of our study area, we highlighted historical
asymmetries between rural communities and conservation
agencies. Although Zimbabwe pioneered the formalization of
community-based natural resources management with the iconic
CAMPFIRE program launched in the early 1980s (Murphree
2013), conservation management remains the prerogative of state
institutions, and rural communities are effectively not recognized
as legitimate actors in the matter. Designers of participatory
processes should, therefore, ensure that the less influential
stakeholders are given a voice and are able to assert their interests.
This implies that all actors should not be involved equally in all
the stages of a multistakeholder process, at least not until the less
powerful are able to defend their interests (Edmunds and
Wollenberg 2001). Codesigning the tool intended to support a
dialogue arena was a way to empower rural communities. One
could argue that we did not empower rural communities as a
whole, but only a few individuals who were involved in the
codesign activities, and among them, five facilitators in particular.
Nevertheless, we provided evidence that “Kulayijana” represents
rural communities’ perspectives of the interaction between
communal land and wildlife. As such, we made sure that other
actors playing the game would be exposed to villagers’ interests,
whether villagers are present during the playing session or not.
Furthermore, the sense of ownership of the game by the codesign
team and their desire to use the game in multistakeholder
negotiations are encouraging.  
When involved in a participatory process, researchers need to be
reflexive about their posture and about their social position in the
system they work in (Daré et al. 2010). The same way we
considered power asymmetries and adopted a strategic posture,
we also considered how local actors perceived us. Many
conservation-related research activities are conducted in the area
in collaboration with Hwange National Park and the Sikumi
Forest authorities (e.g., Chamaillé-Jammes et al. 2008, Muboko
et al. 2014, Ndaimani et al. 2016). This often leads rural
communities to assimilate all researchers as conservation agents.
We first had to change this perception and gain legitimacy in the
local villagers’ eyes. The ethnographic field work undertaken
beforehand and the months spent living in the villages were
necessary to gain this legitimacy. As stated by Mathevet et al.
(2011), the engagement of local actors as effective collaborative
partners within the working team is key. Building legitimacy is an
iterative and adaptive process engaged between actors (Barnaud
2013). The positive perception of the codesign process by local
team members, the sense of ownership of the model that grew
progressively, and their expressed motivation to pursue the
collaboration are significant signs of an acquired legitimacy that
needs to be nurtured during the next steps of our work.
Modeling with nonacademics: simply prepare complexity
Unlike other participatory modeling processes based on role-
playing games (e.g., Souchère et al. 2010, Gourmelon et al. 2013),
we chose not to start by codesigning a conceptual model, but to
initiate the participatory modeling process with an object that
already took the form of a role-playing game. This strategy relied
on the idea that a role-playing game, that is a form of interactive
model, is easy for nonacademics to understand, analyze, and
criticize. Participants are comfortable providing direct inputs
when put in an active position where each action is consequential
and shows the strengths or the weaknesses of the underlying
model. Yet, codesigning a model with people that are not used to
manipulating such abstract and stylized representations proved
to be challenging.  
Social–ecological dynamics are complex and unpredictable
(Epstein et al. 2013), and modeling any social–ecological system
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implies dealing with uncertainty (Walker et al. 2003, Brugnach et
al. 2008). The appropriate level of details needed to describe a
specific system adequately to design a model is an ongoing debate
in the scientific community (Evans et al. 2013). Simple models
will deliver insights on general patterns (Parker et al. 2003) but
will fail to accurately describe specific systems. Complex models
relying on empirical data may represent “real-world” context-
specific problems more accurately, but their high level of detail
requires a large amount of data and makes them difficult to use
with nonmodelers, and their outputs can seldom be generalized
to other situations (Sun et al. 2016). In choosing the right degree
of model complexity, the critical point remains the goal assigned
to the process of designing and/or using them. Assuming that
simple abstract models are mostly useful for theory building and
education whereas more complex empirically grounded models
are meant for prediction and decision-making support, Sun and
colleagues (2016) argue that models mixing simplified and
empirical components could lead to greater confusion. With our
specific objective to support the setting-up of a multistakeholder
dialogue arena by first involving grassroots people (smallholder
farmers), we relied on empirically grounded stylized facts to
design the prototype version (V0) of the game. It allows an easier
understanding of the design’s objectives by local members, while
leaving space for a collective complexification on the model. In
an iterative process like ours, the choice of which elements are
included or left out of the first version is critical. These elements
must reflect a sound initial knowledge of the system, without
constraining too much the codesign process. The V0 of our role-
playing game was also purposively incomplete as we left out
several elements of the social–ecological system studied, although
we suspected that they would play an important role. This eased
the initiation of a critique/redesign dynamic from local members.
In a way, we distorted the KISS (“keep it simple stupid”; Axelrod
1997) principle: the extreme simplification did not seek to enable
producing generic results but to stimulate the involvement of local
actors in the model codesign process. Initiating the codesign with
an incomplete and partly discordant representation of reality also
helped highlight the need for local actors to identify and fill the
knowledge gaps, therefore breaking the “foreigner white-male
positionality of researchers” (Stringer et al. 2006). During the
design of Kulayijana, the complexity of the game increases
gradually through collective negotiation: existing modules were
refined, and/or new modules were included whenever the
participants deemed it necessary.
Strategic negotiation of uncertainties
Uncertainties are at the core of social–ecological systems (Walker
et al. 2003, Mathevet et al. 2016). Epistemic uncertainties come
from the lack of knowledge about a given system (we do not know
everything). Ontological uncertainties are related to the intrinsic
unpredictability of social–ecological systems (our scientific
understanding does not allow us to predict all of the dynamics
and properties) (Walker et al. 2003). When looking at the
interactions between actors of a social–ecological system, a third
type of uncertainty appears: different actors have different views
and opinions of a given reality, therefore voicing different yet valid
interpretations of reality (Dewulf et al. 2005, Brugnach et al.
2008). Uncertainties have become highly topical to natural
resources management and environmental science (Pahl-Wostl
2007, Brugnach et al. 2008). Over the past decades, the perception
of uncertainty by researchers has changed. Uncertainty is no
longer something to get rid of, but is accepted as an inherent and
necessary part of life (Brugnach et al. 2008). Approaches to deal
with and model uncertainties have been developed, most of the
time relying on formal and quantitative methods using statistical
analyses (e.g., with confidence intervals, probability distributions).
When applied to epistemic or ontological uncertainties, such
approaches can provide useful results, for instance probabilistic
estimates of flood events (Chen and Yu 2007) or probabilistic
climate forecasts (Gneiting et al. 2007). Nevertheless, when
uncertainty arises not only from a lack of knowledge, but also
from the fact that the problem cannot be clearly defined, that
information is incomplete and not quantifiable, and that different
legitimate views of the system exist—in other words, when we
deal with ̶wicked” problems—a probabilistic transformation of
uncertainty is impossible (Allen et al. 2011).  
To cope with uncertainties, we chose the negotiation approach
(Leeuwis 2000). Our vision of the system, that is our mind-frame,
necessarily differed from that of local actors. The ethnographical
fieldwork contributed to acquiring a partial understanding of
endogenous mind-frames, but a deeper understanding of local
mind-frames was necessary. An exogenous role-playing game
would have been a manifestation of the researcher’s mind-frame,
and using it with people having different mind-frames may
increase rather than reduce and hinder its use in a
multistakeholder arena. Through the codesign process, we went
from a high level of ambiguity of multiple mind-frames analyzing
reality differently, to a collectively negotiated consensual mind-
frame shared by researchers and local actors.  
During the codesign, each actor brought in his own knowledge,
and mixed and negotiated it with the others. In other words, actors
were negotiating uncertainties. For instance, researchers did not
know the specific composition of the grazing lands used
(epistemic uncertainties) or the impact of cattle grazing on fodder
availability in the study area (ontological uncertainties). To cope
with the lack of scientific knowledge, we collectively designed a
forage module for the game based on the combined experiential
knowledge of researchers and local members of the team who are
custodians of the system. As the exact dietary regime of cattle is
complex, multifactorial (e.g., age, diseases, physiological and
reproductive status...) and adaptive in space and time, we
proceeded in a similar way to negotiate the module describing the
dynamics of cattle body condition. Codesigning the game was
therefore a way to collectively negotiate a consensual uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the issue of coexistence between a protected area and
its rural periphery, we engaged in a long-term participatory
process to establish a multistakeholder arena. Our hope was to
facilitate fair and efficient discussions and negotiations between
local actors to produce socially and ecologically sustainable
management practices. In this paper, we present the first step that
consisted of the codesign of a role-playing game for local farmers.
“Kulayijana” was validated by other members of local
communities who perceived the game as a fair representation of
their reality, allowing them to reproduce their actual practices and
improve their own understanding of the social–ecological system.
The game was also praised by Sikumi Forest managers as a
promising tool to establish a dialogue with the farmers, which was
our main objective for this phase of the project.  
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One of the current limitations of “Kulayijana” is that it only
represents one type of actors (rural communities), whereas the
ambition is to promote multistakeholder interactions. In order to
promote the dialogue, involving other local actors appears as the
necessary next step. This involvement could take different forms,
and must be decided collectively with the codesign team and
protected areas managers. A possibility would be to include local
actors in the identification of scenarios and social–ecological
indicators that could be tested and explored with “Kulayijana.”
Such an endeavor could lead to additional refinements and
modifications of the current game. Another option would be to
formalize strategies played in the different sessions to define the
behavior of agents in autonomous simulations. Collectively
designed scenarios could therefore also be tested through agent-
based simulations.  
The enthusiasm of local actors must not make us forget that the
top-down centralized management of Zimbabwean protected
areas remains. If  we aim to foster the creation of participatory
management plans involving conservation and rural actors, a
local initiative is insufficient, and higher hierarchical levels will
have to be convinced. This next step will be crucial to the success
of our endeavor. This is why national workshops and meetings
are already organized and will involve regional and national
actors of conservation in Zimbabwe.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/8962
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Appendix 1. Kulayinjana, Overview-Design-Details (ODD) 
 
The description of the model is based on the updated version (Grimm et al. 2010) of the ODD 
protocol that was originally proposed by Grimm and his colleagues in 2006. The model was 
uploaded on https://www.openabm.org/model/5221.  
Purpose 
The purpose of the game is to bring players to incarnate farmers in a virtual 
environment mimicking their reality, and to collectively learn about the use of the landscape 
through cattle herding. 
Entities, state variables and scales 
Cells are the elementary spatial entities of the model. The whole space is divided in 
two Zones, the first one representing Communal Land and the other representing Forest. 
Some forage is available in both zones.  
In the model, a Household is either controlled by a human player (played household) or 
connected by the computer to a played household (computerized farm; it then behaves as a 
clone). In the communal land, Households manage Farms. A farm is made up of an 
aggregation of 6 cells: 5 Fields adjacent to 1 Kraal (enclosure for cattle). Played households 
own Cattle, an initial herd of 5 Cows that can be guarded by a Herdboy while grazing. Each 
Cow has a status (thin, medium or fat) that changes over time according to how the cow fed. 
On their Fields, played Households can grow 2 varieties of Maize (short-term and long-term). 
When harvested, crop leftovers, called Machanga, represent a source of food for the cows. 
GrazingAreas (also called paddocks) represent the management units for cattle herding in the 
model. Grazing areas are aggregates of cells. There are 4 grazing areas in the Communal Land 
and 9 grazing areas in the Forest. The level of forage of each grazing area is null, depleted, 
medium or good. It changes according to the load of cattle, the season and the rainfall. Some 
grazing areas have Waterpans. When these water pans are not dried out, they are used by the 
cows located there.  
Wildlife (lions and elephants) are likely to cause some disturbance to the cattle and the crops 
of the households.  
An overview of the overall structure of the model is provided by a UML class diagram (see 
figure 1).  
 
  
Figure 1. Class diagram of the Kulayinjana model.  
 
 
Players have two objects of decision making at the beginning of each month: their 
cattle and their fields. Concerning cattle, they have to choose in which grazing area they will 
graze, and if they will be guarded or not, that is if they put a herdboy with the herd or not1. At 
the beginning of the month, players can also decide to buy or sell cattle. Concerning their 
fields, at the beginning of each month players can decide to plow or harvest their fields. Fields 
can only be harvested if the maize is either mature or dry, but in the first case, harvesting 
implies building a granary for the maize to dry up.  
                                                          
1
 In the area, cows are usually grazing during the day, and gathered in the kraal at night we’re the Kraal serves 
as a protection. In the model (and in the game), only active phases of cattle herding are considered, and nights 
are not simulated.  
All of these actions obey specific cost/benefit rules. These rely on tokens that are distributed 
to, or given back by players. There are two types of tokens, small ones (ST) and big ones 
(BT). A big token equals six small ones. The balance of tokens is stored in households’ 
cashboxes. The main parameters of the model are listed in table 1. The way these parameters 
affect the various processes is explained in the “details” subsection (last part of the ODD 
protocol). 
 
Entity Parameter Value Unit 
    
GrazingArea cattleOverloadThreshold 10 cow 
 protectionAtNightAgainstElephants 3 small token 
    
Cow fatteningThreshold 6 satiation index 
 wastingThreshold 3 satiation index 
 marketPrice_Fat 18 small token 
 marketPrice_Medium 12 small token 
 marketPrice_Thin 6 small token 
    
Cattle herdboyCost 1 small token 
 grazingAreaCrossingCost 1 small token 
 wateringCost 1 small token 
 damageMaize_Cattle 25% expected yield 
    
Wildlife damageMaize_Elelephant 50% expected yield 
    
Maize damageMaize_Climate 100% expected yield 
 establishmentCost 6 small token 
 yieldIncome 12 small token 
 Machanga 2 small token 
 machangaFeedingCapacity 1 satiation index 
    
Household  initialCashbox 48 small token 
    
Farm granaryCost 1 small token 
 
Table 1. Model parameters. 
 
 
The time step of the model2 represents one day. The game covers two agricultural 
years, from the beginning of October (year1) to the end of September (year2). Players’ 
decisions are done only at the beginning of the month. To complete a game session, 24 rounds 
of decisions have therefore to be achieved. The virtual environment (Fig.2) referred to as “the 
map” is a grid of 60*40 square cells. The size of a cell was defined by the design team so that 
one cell represents one “umfollow”, that is the surface that one farmer can plough in one day. 
Therefore, the cells’ area is 0.5acre (45m*45m). The total surface covered by our virtual 
environment is 2400 cells, that is 1200 acres.  
 
 
Figure 2. The virtual environment. The virtual environment is divided in 13 GrazingAreas numbered C1 to C4 in 
the communal land, F1 to F9 in the forest. Each played Farm has its Kraal colored according to the player in 
charge (2 played Farms by communal GrazingArea), the 5 fields appearing in orange (5 orange cells around the 
Kraal). Farms with no Kraal are clones managed by the model. The green entities seen on fields represent 
growing Crops (triangles are short term maize; rounds are long term maize).   The figure shows three of the four 
different forage levels: “poor” (F1 and F4); “medium” (C1 to C4). and “good” (F2, F3, F5, F6, F7, F8 and 
F9). These levels change during the game according to players’ actions. 
 
Process overview and scheduling 
                                                          
2
  The playing time step is a month, that is that players make their decisions at the beginning of the month. The 
model supporting the game has a daily time step. In other words, the model does 30 time steps between each 
round.  
The model presented here supports a role-playing game and as a result, is not run 
“continuously”, but is stopped and resumed for players to make their decisions (Fig.3).  
At the beginning of the game, players choose from predefined locations which farm they want 
to manage. Then the simulation is scheduled by month.  
At the beginning of the month, a weather forecast is given for the first week. Players notify 
with pawns if they want to plant Maize. Players put a pawn on each field they want to plow, 
knowing that each field can only have one growing Maize at a time. There are two types of 
pawn, corresponding to the two type of Maize. If some of the Maize is ready to be harvested, 
the players can choose to harvest. In that case, they have to notify if they leave the crop 
residue in the field (can be used by any Cattle), or if the crop residues are stored within the 
Kraal. To do so, they use pawns that they directly put on the game board.  Players also decide 
in which GrazingArea they want their Cattle to graze daily for the next four weeks, and if they 
will be guarded by a Herdboy3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Sequential mobilization of the modules during the playing session. A round of playing, that is a month 
in the model, is done in four steps. Grey phases represent moments were the model is run, white phases are 
moments when the model is paused.  The model is constituted of different modules, controlling specific dynamics 
(see next paragraphs). These modules are mobilized at specific steps of the month, as showed by the figure. 
                                                          
3
 See foot note 71. 
  
Once all the decisions are entered by the computer operator (Fig. 4), the model is run for 30 
time steps (a month). 
During the month, the climate is updated weekly. Players have access to a table displayed in 
the game’s interface where the amount of rain is retrospectively shown (Fig. 5). Maize entities 
are updated daily (Fig. 8) by the computer (stages, failures). 
At the end of the month, the Cattle damage module is run (cattle entering fields); the Wildlife 
module is run (lion attack and elephant crop raiding); Cattle statuses are updated according to 
the forage level of the GrazingArea they were using; the forage of every GrazingArea is 
updated. The number of cattle owned by players is updated along with cattle conditions. So 
are the sizes of Waterpans. Finally, the cashboxes of the 8 played households are updated. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Interface used by the computer operator to enter players’ decisions at the beginning of each month. 
The “protection against elephants” can be filled with the initials of the players paying to protect a communal 
GrazingArea (in this case no one protected any). The “cattle transaction” box deals with cattle sales and 
purchases (here the Black player sold a medium cow to the market and earned 12ST). The “Farming and 
Cattle” relates to crops and cattle herding. Here for instance, the black players decided to plant two of his fields 
with short-term maize and to put his Cattle -guarded by the Green herdboy- in C2. 
  
 
 
Figure 5. The weekly rainfall calendar. The sun corresponds to a dry week, a light cloud represents 5-20mm of 
rain, a grey cloud represents 20-40mm of rain, the dark cloud represents +40mm of rainfall. The first of June is 
indicated as xotshela, a Ndebele word meaning “to push”, that corresponds to the historical traditional date 
when cattle are released freely in the fields to eat the crops leftovers. 
 
 
Design Concepts 
The game was co-designed by researchers and representatives of the local community 
studied, with the objective of proposing a role-playing game mimicking local for players to 
reproduce their actual practices. The agents’ behavior is not programmed, but is left open for 
players to make choices. The consequences of players’ decisions are public. The players can 
therefore learn and adapt. 
We assume that players make, to a certain extent, their decision following the same rationale 
they would use in the real life. The extent to which they reproduce their actual practices is 
assessed through a post-playing questionnaire. 
Uncertainty is part of the model supporting the game. Wildlife actions for instance are based 
on probabilities, and players must consider risks while managing their cattle and fields. 
Similarly, when they have to make decisions, players do not know in advance the rainfalls of 
the coming month, except for the first week that is announced with a “weather forecast”. 
Assessing the way players deal with such uncertainties is one of the objectives of the game. 
Being implemented as a role-playing game, interactions among agents are central. Players are 
free to talk during the gaming session, including talking together to advise or seek advice, 
congratulating or mocking, coordinating or working together. In particular, they can make 
agreements to share the cost of guarding their cattle and the cost of guarding their communal 
paddock at night to prevent crop raiding by elephants. 
The played households have similar characteristics at the beginning of the game. The players 
manipulate or own the same entities (5 fields, 5 cows) and have the same initial number of 
tokens. Nevertheless, we assume that a diversity of strategies and objectives will be exhibited 
during the gaming sessions, reflecting heterogeneity in the decision-making processes and 
objectives among the participants. Eliciting player’s strategies and objectives and relating 
them to their strategies and objectives in their “real-life” is the heart of the post-game 
debriefing. 
Some stochasticity is found in the Wildlife and the Cattle damage modules. The same 
predetermined sets of “random” events are used for each gaming session. standardizing the 
randomness is needed to ensure the comparability of the playing sessions.  
The observation of the gaming sessions is supported by the use of the computer. Every 
playing decision is recorded, along with environmental parameters. Furthermore, 
supplementary information can be extracted from playing sessions through the replay function 
of the simulation platform used (CORMAS). Additionally, a member of the facilitation team 
records social interactions by taking pictures and collecting minutes later on organized in 
snippets of conversation relevant to various themes to be discussed during the post-game 
debriefing. After playing, questionnaires are administered to all participants.  
Implementation details 
The model was developed through several participatory workshops. The computer part 
was implemented with the Cormas simulation platform. The game was played 4 times and the 
playing sessions involved a total of 22 players. 
Initialization of the simulation 
The initialization of the simulation was always the same. The model is initiated at the 
beginning of October. All the farms, played (8) and cloned (15), are located by default. There 
are two played farms in each communal GrazingArea (Fig.6). Thanks to a name-drawing 
system, each participant in the playing session is asked to choose which Farm he wants to 
manage. Each players receives an initial cashbox of 48 small tokens (ST) that he will use to 
play (plant, drive his cattle, etc). Finally, each player starts with a Cattle herd of five medium 
Cows. At the start, communal and forest GrazingAreas all have “medium” forage. All the 
herds are in their respective Kraals, and all Waterpans are empty, except the one located on 
F5.  
 
 
Figure 6. The virtual environment at the initiation of the model/playing session. 
 
Input data 
The model used weekly rainfall input data. Rainfall records were obtained in the study area. 
Two contrasted climatic years (Fig. 7) were used to produce a continuous 2-year dataset: a 
first “good year” (2012-13), measured by ourselves in the study area, is followed by a “bad 
year” (data from 1920-21), measured in the study area by the Rhodesian meteorological 
services. As showed in figure 5, the two sets of empirical data used for the rain sub-model 
propose very contrasted climatic conditions. The “good rains” year is characterized by 
abundant rainfall throughout the rainy season, with a total of 733mm, while the “bad rains” 
year only offers 531mm through erratic and low rainfall. This weekly rainfall was 
transformed into four types of week (Fig.5.5): “dry” (<5mm); small rain (<20mm); “medium 
rains” (20 to 40mm); “big rains” (>40mm).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7. Weekly rainfall data. The figure shows the two sets of data used for the rain module.  
 
 
Details for crop sub-model 
This module controls crops dynamics and weather-related failures. There are two types 
of Crop. They have the same productivity, but differ by their growing dynamics. Once planted 
(stage: seed), both short-term and long-term types germinate after the first non-dry week 
(stage: germinated) and remain in that stage –prone to rain washing– for two months, until 
they evolve to the “shooting” status. Crop types differ by the time needed to change from the 
stage shooting to the stage mature: 1 month for the short-term variety against 2 months for the 
long-term variety. The transition diagrams are represented in figure 8. Players can harvest 
their crops when they are either “mature” or “dry”. Nevertheless, when players harvest 
“mature” crops they must build a granary, unless they already have one.  
Crops are sensitive to drought. Between the moment they are planted and the end of 
December, three consecutive weeks without rain cause a loss of 100% of every growing short-
term crop. Long-term crops are more resistant: they need four weeks of drought to be 
destroyed. On the other hand, during the germinated stage of development, crops are also 
sensitive to floods, and both types will be destroyed (100%) by three consecutive weeks of 
heavy rains. 
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Figure 8. Crops transition diagrams.  
 
 
Details for elephant damages 
The module related to damages made by wild herbivores (only elephants are represented in 
the model) to crops is run at the level of grazing areas. Each month, grazing areas that are not 
protected by players and containing at least one field with a mature maize have 94/100 
chances of being attacked by elephants. When elephants attack, all the farms are not impacted 
the same way. The first line of farms (Fig.9) will have up to three fields damaged, whereas the 
other farms of the grazing area will only have one field attacked. An attack will cause a loss 
of 50% of the yields.  By protecting their grazing area, players decrease the chances of having 
elephants attacking to 6/100. Attack of Elephants are represented on the visual interface of the 
game (Fig. 9), and losses caused by elephants are represented by a blue diamond on the corner 
of each attacked field.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Elephants’ damages. Grazing areas with mature maize (here C1, C2 and C3) are prone to crop 
raiding by elephants. C2, which was not guarded (no small green circles at the edge between the communal land 
and the forest) was attacked by elephants. Farms located on the right side of the red line are considered as the 
first line of farms. These farms are more heavily impacted by the attack.   
 
 
Details for cattle damages 
In the paper, we described the rule according to which cattle cannot be released freely 
in the village before a particular date: Xotshela (usually the 1
st
 of June). Nevertheless, it was 
collectively agreed that the game would contain no enforcing mechanisms, but that the 
players themselves would be free to discuss, apply and respect this rule or not during the 
game. Therefore, in the model supporting the game, cattle can graze anywhere anytime and 
when grazing in the communal area during the agricultural season, cattle entities can enter 
fields and cause agricultural loses if these contain crops. Unguarded cattle (without herdboy) 
will enter a randomly picked field with growing maize, and cause 25% loss of the yield the 
owner would have get from the maize entity growing there. Repeated loses caused by cattle or 
wildlife will ultimately destroy maize entities. A given cattle can enter only one field per 
month. Once the module is run, the visual interface is updated: a message is displayed on the 
game’s interface to inform the players: “Player…your cattle entered the field of player…”; the 
cattle entity is displayed on the field it entered and the losses are represented on the field 
(Fig.10); the loses are stored and the yields the player will get when he harvests are modified. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Cattle entering a Field. The cattle of the purple player were left alone to graze in this communal 
paddock containing growing fields. They entered a growing field of the olive player. The white lozenge on the 
corner of the field of the olive player signifies a loss of 25%.  
 
 
Details for cattle status dynamics 
Every month, the level of satiation (0, 1 or 2) of a cow is determined accordingly to 
the level of forage of the grazing area where the cow was located. When cows are feeding on 
crop residues (machanga), the satiation is set to the number of machanga eaten (max. 2). The 
status of a cow depends on how it fed during the last three months: when its accumulated 
satiation is 6, its status increases, whereas when the accumulated satiation of a cow is less or 
equal to 3, its status decreases. 
Details for cattle predation by lion 
The predation module was entirely re-designed during workshops. This module is 
applied at the level of a grazing area. To allow comparison of the role-playing game sessions, 
the randomness assigned to this process was eliminated by pre-defining the occurrences of 
cows being killed by a lion in the forest. Numbers are given in table 2.  
 
GrazingAreas in the forest Occurrences of presence of cattle in the subarea 
area at which a kill will be considered 
Nearby forest (F1, F4, F7) 3 8 14 
Middle forest (F2, F5, F8) 2 5 9 12 16 
Deep forest (F3, F6, F9) 1 2 4 6 7 9 11 12 14 
 
Table 2. Predefined timing for cattle predation by lion. 
 
 
In the nearby forest, every 5-6 times some cattle will be there, a kill by the lion is considered. 
In the middle forest, the periodicity is decreased to every 3-4 times, whereas in the deep 
forest, the periodicity is set to every 1-2 times. The frequency of grazing and the distance to 
the forest’s edge are therefore the two factors taken into consideration to trigger the event 
“lion’s kill” in the forest. Once such a kill is considered, its actual realization depends on the 
presence of herdboys. When all cattle are guarded by a herdboy, the probability that the kill 
fails is 2/3. Otherwise, the kill will occur and it is 30 times more likely to happen to a non-
guarded cow than to a cow being guarded.  
Details for forage level in grazing areas and water levels in water pans 
These two modules rely on tabulated functions. The forage level of each grazing area is 
updated at the end of each month according to: (i) the month, (ii) the rainfall of the current 
month, and (iii) the number of cows that grazed during this month. Furthermore, a specific 
function was designed for each climatic year (Fig.11 and Fig.12). An additional feature was 
decided during the co-design of the model: the four communal grazing areas (C1, C2, C3 and 
C4) would never reach the “good” level of forage, but would remain “medium” at best.  
The size of the water pans is also updated at the end of the month. It is not influenced by the 
number of cows drinking, but relies on a tabulated function designed according to monthly 
rainfall (Fig. 11 and Fig.12). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 11. A representation of the tabulated function controlling the forage level of grazing areas and the size of 
water pans for the “Good Rain” year. The three diagrams represent the forage level at the end of each month in 
a given grazing area according to the number of cows grazing during the month. A: no cow grazing; B:  between 
1 and 10 cows; C: more than 10 cows. The circles in each month represent the size of water pans. Monthly 
rainfall is given on the inner wedges. 
 
  
 
Figure 12. A representation of the tabulated function controlling the forage level of grazing areas and the size of 
water pans for the “Bad Rain” year. The three diagrams represent the forage level at the end of each month in a 
given grazing area according to the number of cows grazing during the month. A: no cow grazing; B:  between 1 
and 10 cows; C: more than 10 cows. The circles in each month represent the size of water pans. Monthly rainfall 
is given on the inner wedges. 
 
Choice, design and parametrization of the modules 
All modules were either collectively designed, or proposed by researchers and 
modified/validated by the other members of the team. The testing of each module was done 
through the co-design process. Each version of the game was tested (played) by the team, 
collectively discussed and modified/validated. 
 
